In his Mail article Michael Gove sets out a seven-point Brexit strategy. Here are his seven proposals in his own words. I’ve added numbers, and bold type, but otherwise the text is as it is in the Gove article. Underneath each point I’ve posted a critique.
Overall, it is remarkable how little he has to add to what Theresa May has already tried.
1 – “A Conservative, politician-led, negotiating team. I will make sure MPs across the party are involved in shaping our negotiating stance and we have proper leadership in the direct talks with Brussels. My policy unit will be our parliamentary party.”
Analysis: For the last three years the UK has had a Conservative, politician-led negotiating team. It is called the cabinet. This paragraph reflects the Brexiter myth that the flaws in Britain’s Brexit strategy are all the fault of Olly Robbins, the PM’s chief Brexit adviser, who is a civil servant, but who does work for the prime minister. Gove’s promise to use the parliamentary party as his “policy unit” sounds like something that will appeal to MPs, who decide the final two in the Tory leadership contest, but it is not practical, given how divided the parliamentary party is. And does he really want to contract policy-making out to the European Research Group?
2 – “We need a new approach to Northern Ireland – a union guarantee. That means listening to our unionist friends in Northern Ireland who want to see a so-called ‘Stormont Lock’ which would guarantee in international law that there won’t be any difference in laws across the UK unless the Northern Ireland assembly and executive agrees. I will also personally lead the talks to get devolved government back up and running in Northern Ireland.”
Analysis: Gove seems to have forgotten that the government has already published, in January, plans for a so-called ‘Stormont lock’ (pdf) that would ensure no regulatory divergence between Great Britain and Northern Ireland under the backstop. And in March, in her speech before the second vote on her deal, Theresa May explicitly promised to legislate for these proposals. Gove’s promise to personally lead talks to get power-sharing restored in Northern Ireland would mark a difference from May, who has been relatively disengaged from this process, but his intervention might not be helpful. Gove opposed the Good Friday agreement, and in the past he has been seen as a pro-unionist ultra; he would find it hard persuading nationalists and republicans that he was a neutral arbiter.
3 – “A fullstop to the backstop. We need a dedicated minister leading the search for alternative arrangements for the Irish border – supported with proper funding and intensive technical work. We have to remove any risk that we could be trapped in a backstop, so I will work with the Irish government and Brussels to secure a clear exit mechanism, compatible with the principle of consent for Northern Ireland.”
Analysis: The only thing new about this is the soundbite. The government already has a “dedicated minister” working on the backstop and related Brexit issues – the Brexit secretary, who heads a department, DExEU, with almost 700 staff – and May and her three successive Brexit secretaries have spent countless hours already trying, without success, to do exactly what Gove proposes – remove the risk of the UK being held permanently in the backstop.
4 – “No second referendum. Holding one would make divisions worse and give the Scottish Nationalists another excuse to try to break up our union.”
Analysis: May repeatedly stressed her opposition to a second referendum and Number 10 said she would not agree to one “in any circumstances”. Gove is just restating this position.
5 – “A Canada-style deal. The best way to honour the referendum result is to secure a bespoke agreement based on the free trade agreement between Canada and the EU, tailored for Britain’s needs. This means free trade as well as taking back control of our laws, borders and money.”
Analysis: This does mark a departure from May’s position. The political declaration on the future UK-EU trade relationship that May negotiated with Brussels was flexible enough to cover a range of outcomes, but May’s Chequers plan would have effectively kept the UK in the single market (bound by the ‘common rulebook”) for goods. Gove is rejecting this. His eventual Brexit outcome would be harder than May’s.
6 – “Action this day. We must leave the EU as soon as we can. I want us to leave before October 31 and that will be my goal. I won’t be engaging in can-kicking or dithering.”
Analysis: This is not so much a policy as a jibe about May “dithering”. It is certainly true that she did repeatedly delay key decisions and votes on Brexit. But that was because she could not find a policy acceptable to both the EU and her backbenchers. There is nothing in what Gove has said that suggests he would be any more likely to pass a deal.
7- “A Brexit rule: always choose Brexit over No Brexit. If, finally, it comes to a decision between no-deal and no Brexit, I will choose no-deal – it’s a democratic imperative that we must leave the EU before the next general election or we risk letting Jeremy Corbyn into Downing Street. I’ve been involved in no-deal planning. I recognise, of course, it would mean short-term turbulence, but we would get through it and ultimately prosper.”
Analysis: This is slightly different from the line taken by May. Although she originally said no-deal would be better than a bad deal, in recent months she tried to avoid answering questions about whether no-deal was preferable to no Brexit, and she eventually ended up saying parliament would never agree to no-deal. Gove is making it clear that he would be willing to go for no-deal. But almost all the other candidates in the Tory leadership contest have also said they would prefer no-deal to no Brexit, so this is not a statement that differentiates him.
In his article Gove also challenges the argument that the renegotiation he is proposing his unobtainable. He says:
Some say that Brussels won’t negotiate with us any more. Certainly, EU negotiators recognise a cross-party agreement is now out of reach. They know parliament won’t pass the same deal as proposed by Theresa May without legally-binding changes. They also saw the European election results, where the Brexit party’s success was a reminder Britain has not changed its mind since the referendum.
Yet I believe that European leaders want to find a way through this. I’m convinced they want to conclude these talks as quickly as possible so we’re on course to leave by October 31.
Again, almost all the Tory leadership candidates are making the same claim – that, faced with a new PM, the EU would make compromises it has not been willing to make already. It is undoubtedly true that EU leaders would like to see Brexit resolved by the end of October. But they have repeatedly said the withdrawal agreement cannot be renegotiated and there is very little evidence that they would be willing to make the concessions being demanded by Gove, or any of his Tory leadership rivals.
