Boris Johnson’s first efforts at diplomacy as prime minister this week have been hailed by some domestic allies as a triumph. This is stretching it. His earlier insistence that he would not discuss the UK’s departure from the EU until the so-called Irish backstop was scrapped altogether was never sustainable. Visits to Paris and Berlin were inevitable. Talking will always be better than not talking and the meetings secured him some political breathing space. Nonetheless, no one should get overexcited at the progress so far.
German chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments that the UK and EU can “find a solution in the next 30 days” to the impasse over the Irish backstop, which were echoed by French president Emmanuel Macron, have been interpreted by some as opening the door to an accelerated Brexit deal, which would include an alternative to the backstop designed to prevent a customs and regulatory border on the island of Ireland. Allies of the German chancellor say she was just being polite. Others suggest she was underlining British responsibility for any disruption.
Mr Johnson risks making the same mistake as his predecessors. Successive Conservative prime ministers have overestimated and misinterpreted the intentions of Ms Merkel — both in terms of what she is willing to do and her influence within the EU. Fatefully, David Cameron misread her in his attempt to veto Jean-Claude Juncker’s appointment as European Commission president and in his attempt to renegotiate the UK’s membership of the trading bloc.
As well as flying to Paris and Berlin, Mr Johnson should have gone to Dublin. The key relationship if he genuinely wishes to leave the EU with a deal is with Ireland. After the UK itself, Britain’s closest neighbour stands to lose the most from the economic disruption and played the pivotal role in ensuring that any settlement over the border was included in the first stage of talks. If Mr Johnson is to win movement over the backstop, it will have to begin with Leo Varadkar, the Irish Taoiseach.
The mooted “alternative arrangements” do not yet exist. There is no method of keeping the border open, allowing the UK to run an independent trade and regulatory policy, and avoiding any physical infrastructure dividing the Republic of Ireland from Northern Ireland. Some Conservatives believe a solution may be to introduce an exit clause after a long period.
Yet the Taoiseach has limited room for manoeuvre and will not want to appear to his own voters to be backing down to the British. Neither can the EU be confident that such a concession would guarantee the passage of the withdrawal agreement. Former UK Brexit secretary David Davis talked this week of a “shopping list” that included reducing the role of European courts in enforcing any agreement and making payments contingent on a trade deal.
Still, Mr Johnson has managed to surpass low expectations and the positive press will make it harder for Remain-minded Conservatives to organise against him. This is good news for Mr Johnson but may not help the cause of averting a no-deal Brexit.
This round of diplomacy was neither triumph nor disaster. But while the former outcome was always unlikely, the latter was possible. Mr Johnson might have misjudged the tone; Paris and Berlin could have slammed the door on his hopes. Instead, Ms Merkel and Mr Macron evinced flexibility without shifting the EU’s stance.
The door may only be open a crack but it is still ajar. The onus is firmly on Mr Johnson to find a way through. Can-do assertions are a start, but they are no substitute for practical proposals.
